In this paper, we investigate to what extent sovereign stress and banking stress have contributed to the increase in the level and in the heterogeneity of non-financial firms' financing costs in the Euro area during the European debt crisis and how both have affected the monetary transmission mechanism. Employing a large firm-level data set containing 2 million observations we are able to identify the effect of government bond yield spreads (sovereign stress) and the share of non-performing loans (banking stress) on firms' financing costs in a panel model by assuming that idiosyncratic shocks to individual firms are uncorrelated with country-specific variables. We find that the two sources of stress have increased firms' financing costs controlling for country and firm-specific factors. Moreover, we estimate both to have significantly impaired the monetary transmission mechanism.
During the European sovereign debt crisis firms' financing costs have been disconnected from the key monetary policy interest rate in the Euro area. While bank lending rates of non-financial corporations are usually closely related to short-term money market interest rates, the spread between these two rates has considerably increased not only in the course of the worldwide financial crisis in 2008 (from below 2 percentage points to about 3.5 percentage points) but also in 2011 (to about 4 percentage points) when some Euro area countries have experienced sovereign debt crises. Furthermore, the heterogeneity of bank lending rates in various Euro area countries has increased. The difference between maximum and minimum country-specific spreads between short-term bank lending rates of non-financial corporations and the overnight money market rate has been equal to about 1 percentage point before 2008 and up to about 4 percentage points in 2012.
In this paper, we investigate to what extent sovereign stress and banking stress have contributed to this increase in the level and in the heterogeneity of non-financial firms' refinancing costs in the Euro area and how they did affect the monetary transmission mechanism. We use a large firm-level data set (Amadeus) in order to address two major challenges: Firstly, firms financing costs are of course not only driven by macroeconomic conditions like sovereign stress or banking stress but also by firm-specific characteristics.
If the average riskiness of firms varies across Euro area countries this also affects the relation between monetary policy rates and bank lending rates. By using balance sheet data for non-financial corporations we control for firm-specific characteristics. Secondly, using firm-level data allows a causal interpretation of estimated effects of sovereign stress and banking stress on non-financial firms' financing costs by assuming that firm-specific shocks are uncorrelated with aggregate shocks also because we control for firm-specific characteristics that determine firm-specific risk premiums and for aggregate variables which are related to the aggregate interest rate level in the economy. We provide a more detailed discussion of the exogeneity assumption in section 6. Money market rate Bank lending rate non-stressed countries Bank lending rate stressed countries Percent (Data source: European Central Bank) countries 1 together with the overnight money market rate (Eonia). The dynamics of the rates in the two country groups are the same in the first half of the sample. However, the rates start to diverge in 2011, rising in the stressed and falling in the non-stressed countries.
How can the change in the relation between monetary policy rate and bank lending rates be explained? A couple of recent papers show that sovereign stress in terms of elevated government bond yields may affect financing costs of non-financial corporations. Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) , for example, introduce government bonds as collateral in an otherwise standard New-Keynesian macroeconomic model. Since sovereign stress reduces the price of government bonds their value as collateral is also reduced. As a consequence, lending costs of non-financial corporations increase in response to sovereign stress. Other papers like Gertler and Karadi (2011) stress the healthiness of banks as financial intermediaries. Decreasing government bond prices reduce net worth and, therefore, capital of banks. This makes refinancing more expensive for banks themselves and is also transmitted to non-financial firms' financing costs. Bocola (2016) adds a precautionary motive for banks to the Gertler-Karadi framework and shows that sovereign stress may affect financing costs of non-financial firms through two channels: a risk channel and 1 " Stressed" countries in our sample are Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal, " non-stressed" countries Austria, Finland, France and Germany. See section 3.3 for details on this classification. a liquidity channel. In this framework, the financing costs of non-financial firms depend both on their own productivity and riskiness and on the financial situation of the banks.
In addition to sovereign stress, models of the Gertler-Karadi and Bocola type imply more generally that financing costs of non-financial firms depend on the financial situation of banks. Sovereign stress is by far not the only factor that may negatively affect net wealth of banks. An increase in the share of non-performing loans, for example, does also reduce net worth of banks due to the adjustment of the value of outstanding loans in banks' balance sheets. Therefore, both sovereign stress as indicated by elevated government bond yields and banking stress as indicated by the share of non-performing loans may affect the spread between bank lending rates of non-financial corporations and the monetary policy rate. Since government bond yields and the share of non-performing loans have become more heterogeneous in the Euro area since the European debt crisis, these factors may also explain the disconnection and the heterogeneity of firms' refinancing costs. This also implies a non-linearity in the effect of changes in the monetary policy rate on firms' financing costs: elevated stress levels may impair the monetary transmission channel from policy rates to bank lending rates.
We show (1) that corporate financing costs in stressed countries and in non-stressed countries in the Euro area moved in significantly different directions during the years 2011 and 2012, even after controlling for firm-specific characteristics, while they moved in the same direction before the sovereign debt crisis; that (2) sovereign stress and banking stress significantly increased corporate financing costs; and (3) that both macroeconomic stress factors impaired the monetary transmission mechanism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates the importance of sovereign stress and banking stress for the analysis of firms' financing conditions. Section 3 introduces the micro-level data used throughout the analysis and describes our measure of firms' financing costs. Sections 4 and 5 then highlight the importance of sovereign stress and banking stress for firms' financing costs and the monetary transmission mechanism and describe our measures for the two sources of macroeconomic stress. The empirical approach and the results are presented in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes.
Theoretical channels of stress pass-trough
Our approach of examining the effects of sovereign stress and banking stress on firms' financing costs is motivated by the two channels proposed in Bocola (2016) . He analyzes and estimates the pass-through of sovereign stress on firm borrowing rates through the balance sheets of financial intermediaries. His framework is built on the quantitative DSGE model with financial intermediation of Gertler and Karadi (2011) , in which an agency problem between households and the financial intermediaries introduces a financial accelerator mechanism propagating shocks to the financial intermediaries. Below we will briefly sketch the main aspects of this mechanism and explain the extension introduced by Bocola (2016) as well as the resulting channels of influence on firms' financing costs.
In the framework of Gertler-Karadi, financial intermediaries receive funds from households and lend to firms who use the credit to finance their investments. However, there exists an agency problem between the households and the financial intermediaries, because the bankers operating the financial intermediaries can divert a fraction of the deposits received by the households. Consequently, the latter require the former to fulfill an incentive constraint, according to which the gains of this infidelity can not be larger than the implied costs (households can force unfaithful bankers into bankruptcy). As a consequence, the maximum amount of deposits a banker is entrusted with -and thus his ability to finance firm credit -is tied to his equity serving as collateral. It is in this vein that the agency problem introduces an endogenous constraint on the intermediaries' ability to borrow to the real economy.
A shock to the quality of intermediaries' assets reducing their value therefore weakens intermediaries' balance sheet and decreases equity. Due to the leverage ratio constraint financial intermediaries will then demand less firm assets, i.e. credit to finance new investment. This in turn reduces firm investment and the price of firm assets held by banks, further weakening the intermediaries' balance sheets. As a consequence, the effect of the initial shock to the quality of intermediaries' assets is amplified and can trigger an economic recession. Bocola (2016) In the model, an increased probability of sovereign default and thus higher government bond yields affect credit rates for firms via two channels. First, there is a direct effect through the balance sheets of the financial intermediaries: Rising yields reduce the price of government bonds held by the intermediaries, weakening their balance sheets (B). As a consequence, banks' net worth declines which in turn reduces their ability to obtain funding. The resulting increase in funding costs is passed down to the real economy in form of higher borrowing costs for firms. Second, if the probability of a sovereign default increases, banks anticipate potential losses on their bond holdings and thus tighter funding conditions in the future. In addition, holding firm assets in itself becomes more risky for banks. Once the default occurs, all then constrained intermediaries will sell their firm assets, drastically reducing their value. This so called risk channel generates " a precautionary motive for banks to deleverage and to reduce their holdings of firms'
claims." (Bocola (2016) , p. 3). In conclusion, sovereign stress can reduce the banks' resources to finance firms and banks may be more reluctant to lend due to a precautionary motive. Thus, and in addition to sovereign stress, also banking stress is an important determinant in explaining changes in firms' financing conditions. Therefore, the model implies that the level of both sources of stress impacts monetary policy transmission, as they directly influence optimal behaviour of financial intermediaries when lending to firms.
Related literature has examined specific aspects of the sovereign-banking-firm-nexus. Acharya et al. (2004) develop a model with interdependency between stress in the bank-ing sector and sovereign risk. Gennaioli et al. (2014) in turn examine the effects of government defaults on the banking sector and private credit. And Brutti and Sauré (2015) show that cross-country bank exposures to sovereign debt of Euro area countries propagate sovereign risk. Focusing on sovereign risk alone, Corsetti et al. (2013) argue that the costs of financial intermediation depend on sovereign risk and that higher government risk premiums therefore also increase the wedge between the risk-free rate and private borrowing costs. Besides unconventional monetary policy measures, also other aspect influence sovereign risk premiums. Hatchondo et al. (2017) show that sovereign bond yield spreads depend on the specifics of the issued debt. In addition, we then eliminate those remaining observations containing implausible ratios of balance sheet positions by imposing that fixed assets, long-term borrowed funds and short-term borrowed funds as a ratio of total balance sum, respectively, must be nonnegative and can not exceed 1. For the case of the own funds to balance sum ratio the upper limit applies as well, whereas the non-negativity constraint is not enforced because own funds as measured in a balance sheet can in fact be negative.
From this balance sheet data we utilize seven variables which are relevant for determining the financing conditions of the respective firm (see (Altmann, 2000; Altmann et al., 2014) and the references therein). Euro and up to 50 Million Euro) and 4.27% large (turnover more than 50 Million Euro).
All non-financial sectors are represented.
Measuring financing conditions at the firm level
We measure financing conditions at the firm level by interest payments divided by the average of liabilities in the current and previous period and call this variable financing conditions indicator or simply financing costs R ijt for firm i in country j at time t. The average of two consecutive end-of-year values is taken as proxy for the average amount of debt during the year. It should be noticed that this indicator does not represent marginal borrowing costs but rather average borrowing costs in a specific period. Therefore, changes in bank lending rates on new business are only slowly reflected in our financing costs measure.
Using the financing conditions indicator variable described above, we construct average financing costs for each country by aggregating the firm-level specific financing costs according to
and
for the Euro area as a whole, where J = 8 is the number of countries, N jt the number of firm observations for country j in period t, and R ijt is the financing condition indicator for firm i in country j in period t.
To assess the reasonableness of the generated indicator, figure 2 depicts aggregate bank lending rates for non-financial corporations for the Euro area together with the average value of the financing conditions indicator for each year in the Euro area as a whole.
As can be seen, there are differences in the levels, but the dynamics of both time series are very similar. 4 Comparable results also hold if we examine the individual countries separately (see figure 8 in the appendix). Therefore, the aggregated micro-level data and aggregate bank lending rates capture the same underlying dynamics. Bank lending rate (ECB) Average financing costs (own calculaton)
Percent Percent
Notes: Bank lending rate denotes the short-term bank lending rate as published by the ECB (left scale) and the financing conditions indicator constructed from our individual firm data (right scale).
our constructed financing conditions indicators is a valid proxy for the dynamics of microlevel financing costs.
Firm-level financing conditions in stressed and non-stressed countries
The classification of countries into the two subgroups " stressed" and " non-stressed" is based on the respective country's government bond yield: Those countries with yields above the Euro area average are labeled " stressed" (Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal), whereas those with lower yields are labeled " non-stressed" (Austria, Finland, France and Germany). 5 Applying this classification to our measure of firms' financing costs constructed above we find in figure 3 the same diverging development for the two subgroups in 2012 considering micro data as we observed before with aggregate bank lending rates (figure 1) in section 1: Rates rose in the stressed and fell in the non-stressed countries. In addition, this difference in development can already be observed in 2011. That is, based on our firm-level data, stressed and non-stressed countries exhibited diverging financing While insightful, the graphical analysis of aggregate measures can not answer the question whether the differences in observed outcomes are based on country-specific variables or on differences between the examined country groups with respect to the underlying microlevel data. If these were heterogeneous across countries, we would also expect financing costs to be different. To assess potential differences across countries, table 2 provides summary statistics of the (aggregated) micro variables used for each country.
Although the differences are small for many variables, they are substantial for some, especially with respect to borrowed funds, both long-and short-term, own funds rentability and the return on investment. The latter two are pronouncedly lower in the group of stressed countries (Spain, Ireland, Italy and Portugal). Using micro data we are able to control for these differences on the firm-level. To assess the divergence in aggregate financing costs more analytically, we estimate the following panel specification:
where year t denotes a set of year dummies and year t * stressed a set of interaction terms between these year dummies and the indicator variable stressed which is 1 for stressed countries (Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal) and zero otherwise (Austria, Finland, France, Germany). In addition, we include the set of aforementioned K = 7 firm-specific control variables z ikt and a set of L = 2 country-specific macro control variables w jt to be explained below. The model is specified in first differences in order to account for un- Column 1 contains the baseline specification using only year dummies and the interaction terms between year dummies and stressed, thus quantifying the results observed in figure 3. Reported marginal effects correspond to percentage point changes in firms' financing conditions. Until 2010 the sign of the change in refinancing costs was the same for both stressed and non-stressed countries. This, however, changed in the years As mentioned above, simply looking at the aggregate refinancing costs in the two country groups neglects potential country-and firm-specific heterogeneities across and within countries, respectively. To account for these differences, we add our previously described set of micro variables and dummies controlling for firm size to the baseline specification.
Furthermore, we include the growth rate of gross domestic product and the change in the respective country's unemployment rate to account for real economic activity in the respective countries. The results are depicted in column 2.
As can be seen, the results of the baseline specification remain qualitatively unchanged:
Until 2010 the sign of the change in refinancing costs was the same for both stressed and non-stressed countries, while the change in refinancing costs was negative in non-stressed This sovereign stress in turn negatively affected the financial system, especially the be- havior of banks (Panetta et al. (2011) . The resulting impairment of the monetary transmission mechanism was the ground on which the European Central Bank (ECB) decided to intervene in the public and private debt securities markets.
Evidence on the link between government bond yields and firms' refinancing costs
From the perspective of a bank, government bonds are alternative assets for loans to private households and non-financial corporations. Therefore, the return of government bonds and loans to private households and firms should be connected, especially if the bulk of banks' lending to non-financial corporations is directed to domestic firms as is the case for the countries in our sample. According to the expectation hypothesis of the term structure, government bond yields should reflect expected changes in the money market rate such that bank lending rates and government bond yields of similar maturities should exhibit similar dynamics over time. In addition, banks hold government bonds as assets in their balance sheets and thus are directly affected by changes in the prices of these assets. This is a key mechanism in the model of Bocola (2016) described in the theoretical considerations in section 2. 6 We use the spread of government bond yields against a ref-
erence country (Germany) in order to eliminate the common Euro area wide component of government bond yields.
Banking stress and firm-level refinancing costs
Sovereign stress may not be the sole macroeconomic determinant of firms' financing costs. A potential shortcoming of government bond yield spreads in the European debt crisis is that although they are an important determinant of banking stress, they may not fully capture the distortions in the financial sector. As suggested in the model of Bocola (2016), stress on the financial side is one aspect, however, one also needs to take into account banking stress through the asset side of banks' balance sheets, when real economic fundamentals in stressed countries deteriorate. One variable to measure this dimension is the share of non-performing loans of banks. 7 If the aggregate share of defaults on corporate loans increases in a country, the banks in the respective country may be forced to demand a premium when granting new loans. 8 In addition, Noth and Tonzer (2017) compare commonly used measures of bank risk in the literature and show that the share of non-performing assets (with loans being one component of this measure) performs best in explaining failures of banks one year ahead.
Moreover, non-performing loans are a reasonable measure in the context of our analysis for one important reason. The variable is a real-economic, micro-based measure and as such subject to at most indirect influence of the central bank, unlike the yields 6 For further details on the relationship between bank lending rates for firms and government bond yields see Elton et al. (2001) and Chatelain and Tiomo (2001) ; Chatelain et al. (2003) .
7 Due to data unavailability we estimate the share of non-performing loans for Finland in 2013 by a univariate autoregressive process.
8 See Corsetti et al. (2013) and Zoli (2013) for further considerations on the effects of non-performing loans. on sovereign bonds which as described above are an explicit target of the ECB's unconventional monetary policy actions. Accordingly, this allows analyzing the effects of monetary policy given the real-economic stress in the banking sector. At the same time, the exogeneity assumption we have to presume in order to infer the causal effect of the macroeconomic variables on firm-level financing conditions is fulfilled, as the effect of one single firm on the country average is inconsequential. Therefore, our empirical set-up allows analyzing the causal effect of the macroeconomic variables on firm-level financing conditions. 
Estimation and Results
In order to explore the impact of government bond yields and non-performing loans on firm-specific financing conditions, we estimate the following panel regression model:
where ∆im t denotes the change in the money market rate, ∆ G jt the change in the spread of the government bond yield for country j in period t to the corresponding yield for Germany, and ∆npl jt the change in non-performing loans of banks in country j in period t. ∆im t * G jt and ∆im t * npl jt are the interaction effects between the change in the money market rate and the level of government bond yield spreads and the level of nonperforming loans, respectively. In addition, z ikt denotes the set of K firm-specific control variables, z ikt * ∆im t the interactions between these micro variables and the change in the money market rate, w jt a set of L country-specific macro control variables and α j a set of country fixed effects. G jt and npl jt represent the corresponding levels of the government bond yield spread and non-performing loans, respectively. The model is specified in first differences in order to account for unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity and estimated as a pooled cross-section.
We assume that G and npl are exogenous, that is uncorrelated with firm-specific shocks ε ijt . In case of G, this seems plausible to us because the rise in government bond yields in stressed Euro area countries occurred in the course of the Greek crisis, as can be seen in figure 4 . At that time, the perception of vulnerability of Euro area countries with high debt burdens changed. This change in perception was most likely not triggered by firmspecific idiosyncratic shocks in the countries in our sample; remember that we do not include Greek firms. In case of npl, the exogeneity assumption might be a little bit more questionable, but we do control for firm-specific factors like the ratio of debt to total assets which affect the riskiness of individual firms and for factors that are related to aggregate demand (GDP growth and unemployment rate) and therefore the ability of all firms to repay their debt. However, we cannot completely rule out that our estimated coefficients are biased. If G and npl were endogenous, the correlation between them and the error terms would most likely be positive. Consequently, the corresponding coefficients would be biased upwards.
The interaction effects allow to analyze the effect of monetary policy on firm's financing conditions conditional on the level of sovereign and banking stress. If our exogeneity assumption for G and npl was not fulfilled, the corresponding estimated coefficients would also be biased upwards. However, this would work against our hypotheses for the interaction effects. If we still find significant negative interaction effects, this would actually supports our hypothesis.
The sample is 2005 to 2013 and we again use a balanced panel to deal with potential problems regarding the entry and exit of firms. Standard errors are clustered on the firm level. 9 The results of the estimations are shown in table 4.
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Column 1 presents a naive specification with neither sovereign nor banking stress, but with macro controls, country fixed effects the full set of firm variables, and the full set of interaction terms between the firm variables and the change in the money market rate. The change in the money market rate is estimated to have a positive effect on firms' financing conditions. The coefficient is highly significant and economically large. The marginal 9 Since we observe firm-level data in different countries, different firms in the same country and year may be correlated due to a shared macroeconomic background. Accordingly, there could be cross-sectional dependence for which standard errors need to be adjusted. The natural solution to this potential problem is to additionally cluster the standard errors on the time dimension (two-way clustering). However, Petersen (2009) shows that if the number of clusters in one dimension is very small (in his example 10 years and 10k firms), the estimated standard errors are basically the same whether the researcher clusters just on the larger dimension (the firm level in our case) or on both. We only have 9 clusters in the time dimension (10 years and regression specification in first differences) and more than 200k firms, so the result in Petersen (2009) applies to our case. We were even unable to compute the two-way clustering solution, as Stata could not carry out the command. As a result, we cluster our standard errors on the firm level. The critical assumption in this is that there is no correlation between firms of the same country for different years. We argue that this is highly plausible, since we are dealing with annual data in first differences in our estimations. 10 We provide the full estimation results including the micro variables employed in table 8 in the appendix. Notes: Dependent variable is the difference of the financing conditions indicator. The set of firm-specific variables (micro controls) is described in the text. Marginal effects reported in all columns with clusterrobust standard errors at the firm level in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 5, 1, 0,1 percent levels denoted by *, **, ***, respectively.
effect of the change in the money market rate (taking into account the interaction terms with the set of micro variables) is estimated to be 0.33. Accordingly, the results imply that on average one third of a change in the money market rate is passed on to firms.
To incorporate sovereign stress into the analysis we then add the government bond yield spread in column 2. While the the estimate for the money market rate is basically unchanged, the coefficient on the spread ∆ G is highly significant and has the expected sign -a rise in sovereign stress increases the financing conditions of firms in the respective country, while controlling for the firm-specific and macroeconomic variables described above.
As suggested by the model of Bocola (2016) in section 2 and the considerations in section 5, sovereign stress may not only have a direct effect on firms' financing conditions but in addition an indirect effect through the balance sheets of banks, conjecturing an impor-tant role for banking stress in the monetary transmission mechanism and firms' financing conditions. We take stress in the banking sector into account by adding the share of nonperforming loans to the specification. As can be seen in column 3 of table 4, the change in the share of non-performing loans is estimated to significantly increase firms' financing costs. Note that, while the coefficient estimates are relatively small, the overall effect is economically relevant: The share of non-performing loans in stressed countries increased by roughly 13 percentage points between 2007 and 2013 (see figure 6 ), implying an increase in firms' financing costs by 0.44 percentage points. The remaining coefficients are qualitatively unchanged compared to the previous results.
In the last column we introduce interaction terms for the change in the money market rate with the levels of both the spread and non-performing loans, respectively, to shed light on the question whether the level of existing stress -for both sovereigns and in the banking sector -impairs the monetary transmission mechanism in the Euro area. Our results support this hypothesis, as the coefficients of both interaction terms are estimated to be significantly negative. Accordingly, the level of both sovereign and banking stress reduce the effect of a change in the money market rate on firms' financing conditions, impairing the monetary transmission mechanism.
Although the size of the coefficients on the interaction terms is small, the reducing effects are notable, especially for the share of non-performing loans. Figure 7 plots the marginal effects of a change in the money market rate for different levels of government bond yield spreads and non-performing loans, respectively. In the absence of interaction terms with the two sources of stress, the pass-trough of a change in the money market rate (marginal effect) was estimated to be 0.33 percentage points. However, taking into account interaction effects changes this result, as the marginal effect hinges on the levels of the government bond yield spread and non-performing loans in the respective country. For the highest observed level in the government bond yield spread in our sample, the passthrough is reduced to around 0.28 percentage points. The reducing effect is much larger in the case of non-performing loans, as the estimates imply that the pass-through becomes very small for higher levels of banking stress. For the highest observed level of non- performing loans in our sample, the pass-through of monetary policy is only about 0.11 percentage points, down from 0.4 percentage points when the share of non-performing loans is zero.
Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze to what extent financing conditions of non-financial corporations in the Euro area depend on country-specific factors, in particular the respective country's government bond yield spread versus Germany (sovereign stress) and the share of non-performing loans (banking stress), and how they affect the monetary transmission mechanism. Our main results are that both the government bond yield spread and the share of non-performing loans significantly increase firms' financing costs. This cannot be explained by firm-specific characteristics like leverage or profitability but does also hold true when controlling for firm characteristics. Moreover, both sources of stress have a significantly negative effect on the monetary transmission mechanism. The higher the stress levels the smaller is the reaction of firms' financing conditions to changes in the monetary policy rate. The mitigating effect is particularly pronounced for the share of non-performing loans and the associated banking stress.
This result is important for the effectiveness of monetary policy. Asset purchase programs that target at lowering government bond yields may only have a limited impact on firms'
financing conditions if banking stress is the main reason for high financing costs. For monetary policy to be fully effective -be it conventional interest rate policy or unconventional asset purchase programs -it is necessary to reduce the level of banking stress in all member countries of the Euro area.
A Data A.1 Micro-level data Notes: Dependent variable is the difference of the financing conditions indicator. The set of firm-specific variables (micro controls) is described in the text. Marginal effects reported in all columns with clusterrobust standard errors at the firm level in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 5, 1, 0,1 percent levels denoted by *, **, ***, respectively. Notes: Dependent variable is the difference of the financing conditions indicator. The set of firm-specific variables (micro controls) is described in the text. Marginal effects reported in all columns with clusterrobust standard errors at the firm level in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 5, 1, 0,1 percent levels denoted by *, **, ***, respectively. Country abbreviations " at", " es", " fi", " fr", " ir", " it", " pt" denote Austria, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy and Portugal. Germany is the reference country. Notes: Dependent variable is the difference of the financing conditions indicator. The set of firm-specific variables (micro controls) is described in the text. Marginal effects reported in all columns with clusterrobust standard errors at the firm level in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 5, 1, 0,1 percent levels denoted by *, **, ***, respectively.
